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A scientific mission goes through two
distinct stages, each with its own special
requirements for systems engineering. A
division director at NASA Headquarters, as-
sisted by a program chief and a program
manager, conducts the first stage. These
three people, assisted by committees and
working groups, define the mission, formu-
late its objectives, establish its rough
boundaries and manage the selection of the
experiments. The division director practices
a rough and ready kind of systems engineer-
ing, balancing the desire of the scientist for
the most complex sophisticated instrument
possible against the desire of the Office of
Management and Budget and Congress to re-
duce the NASA budget. If the division direc-
tor's systems engineering is done well, the
mission will be supported and scientific re-
sults obtained. If, on the other hand, the sys-
tems engineering is poor, the mission may be
canceled either because the scientific com-
munity concludes the scientific objectives do
not merit the cost or because the Office of
Management and Budget or Congress thinks
the cost is too high.
After the experiments have been selected,
the action shifts from Headquarters to one of
the NASA Centers, and the second stage be-
gins. A project manager, assisted by a project
scientist and supported by an engineering
and a financial staff, is in charge of the sec-
ond stage. The second stage begins with the
preliminary design phase and ends when the
last scientific paper has been published. All
the hardware for the mission is constructed,
tested and operated in the second stage.
Systems engineers incorporate the scien-
tists and their instruments into the systems
engineering process during the preliminary
design phase. At the conclusion of the
preliminary design phase, the project man-
ager conducts a preliminary design review to
/
assure everyone--the scientists, the project n _
management, the Center management and_
NASA Headquarters--the scientific objec-
tives and requirements have been incorpo-
rated into the systems engineering process.
This paper is organized into four parts. In
the Gestation Phase, I describe the process of
starting a new mission and establishing its
rough boundaries. Next I show how the sci-
entific experiments are selected. Then we en-
ter the Preliminary Design Phase, where we
incorporate the scientist's instruments into
the systems engineering process. Finally, I
show how the Preliminary Design Review
(PDR) assures NASA management and the
scientists that the scientific requirements
have been incorporated into the systems en-
gineering process to everyone's satisfaction.
Throughout I emphasize the dual role of
servant and master that the systems engi-
neer plays with respect to the scientist and
the project manager. As servant, the systems
engineer works to assure the scientists that
the project will meet the requirements of
their experiment and their instrument; as
master, the systems engineer works to as-
sure the project manager that the scientists
and their instrument will meet the require-
ments of the project. A glossary of terms
appears at the end of this paper.
I emphasize the need for the systems en-
gineering process to consider all of the pieces
of hardware that the mission will require
and all the activities that must be conducted
during the entire mission. It is easy, in the
early phases of a mission, to focus on the
spacecraft and the instruments and to ignore
or push into the background those activities
and facilities that will be needed later or are
the responsibility of other offices. The associ-
ate administrator for the Office of Space Sci-
ence and Applications needs to know, before
committing to undertake a mission, that the
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entire mission has been thought through,
that the facilities will be available, and that
the funding is adequate to procure all the
flight and ground-based hardware and to pay
for all the work that will be required.
I arbitrarily end this paper with the PDR.
Clearly there will be continuous interaction
between the scientists and the systems engi-
neers throughout the remainder of the mis-
sion. However, the main purpose of the PDR
is to see that the user requirements have
been properly incorporated into the system.
Other papers discuss the role of systems en-
gineers in later phases of the mission.
THE GESTATION PHASE
If we are to successfully incorporate user
requirements into the systems engineering
process, we need to know how NASA creates
a new mission and establishes its principal
boundaries; we need to know who selects the
scientific instruments and when.
New missions get started in a variety of
ways. A person with a new idea may initiate
a new space mission. A scientist at a NASA
Center or a university may make a discov-
ery, ask a new question or invent a new
instrument. An engineer at a NASA Center
or in industry may invent a new control sys-
tem enabling more precise measurements to
be made. A technology may mature.
New missions have been started this way
in the past, but now, more and more, new
missions either come from a group of people
convened by NASA specifically to think
about new missions or are logical follow-ons
to existing or completed missions. The
Hubble Space Telescope was started as a
logical step after the Orbiting Astronomical
Observatories. Its scientific objectives were
laid down in 1964 during a summer study
conducted for NASA by the National Acade-
my of Sciences Space Science Board. The
Advanced X-Ray Astronomical Facility con-
tinues the x-ray observations begun with
Uhuru and High Energy Astronomy Obser-
vatory. Ulysses continues the study of the
Sun begun by HELIOS. Some missions are
precursors to later more complex missions.
Surveyor and the Lunar Orbiter were pre-
cursors to Apollo. The Lunar Observer and
the Mars Observer, in addition to increasing
our knowledge of the Moon and Mars, will be
designed to provide data needed to design
manned lunar bases and manned missions to
Mars.
Applications missions result from a need
for additional coverage, better resolution,
more complete coverage of the electromag-
netic spectrum or a new operational space-
craft.
Although there is no set process by which
a new mission gets started, once it begins,
there is a fairly predictable process by which
it moves from concept to design to flight.
Usually a new mission gets underway when
a dedicated advocate devotes the time and
energy required to get the idea accepted
within NASA. This advocate may be located
at a Center, a university, another federal
agency, an aerospace company or in NASA
Headquarters. The advocate prepares a
rough design of the spacecraft and a list of
potential instruments. With these in hand,
the advocate buttonholes scientists, engi-
neers, Center and Headquarters personnel to
persuade them to become supporters of the
mission. At a Center, the advocate may boot-
leg some feasibility studies at the Center be-
fore taking the concept to Headquarters. At
some point, the advocate must describe the
mission to the director of the appropriate di-
vision in NASA Headquarters and persuade
the director that NASA should undertake
the mission. If it is an astronomy mission,
the advocate must convince the director of
the Astrophysics Division; if a planetary
mission, the director of the Solar System
Exploration Division; if an Earth science or
applications mission, the director of the
Earth Science and Applications Division.
The director may ask the advocate and
supporters to describe the concept to the ap-
propriate NASA advisory committee or to a
summer study sponsored by the Space
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Science Board. The director may ask a
Center or a contractor to make a feasibility
study of the mission before committing to the
5- or 10-year effort that is required to get a
new mission underway. The advocate may
appeal to the associate administrator for the
Office of Science and Applications to tell a
reluctant division director to undertake the
mission, but until the director is convinced
that the mission is worth doing, it is almost
impossible to get a new mission started.
Once the division director becomes enthu-
siastic about the mission, it will be incorpo-
rated into the director's long-range plan, and
the groundwork will be prepared for approv-
al by NASA senior management, Office of
Management and Budget and Congress.
Once the division director includes a descrip-
tion of the mission in the division's advanced
program, the advocate's work is over; the
mission takes on a life of its own. The divi-
sion director provides funds for studies and
for research and development and may pro-
vide funds to several scientists to begin work
on potential instruments for the mission.
Applications missions are started by an
agreement between the division director at
NASA Headquarters and the division direc-
tor's counterpart at the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, or which-
ever agency needs the mission. They agree
that the mission has merit and that they
should begin to jointly plan for the mission.
Agreements are made as to what research
and development will be conducted, who will
conduct it, and which agency will pay for it.
They will produce a mutually acceptable
plan of action by which they will seek ap-
proval and funds.
SETTING THE BOUNDARIES
The scientific or applications objectives
establish some but not all of the boundaries
of a space mission. Other factors, such as the
kind of transportation or the funds available
help set the boundaries. Nonscientific
criteria may have influenced the scientific
objectives themselves. The initial diameter
of the Hubble Telescope, four meters, was
chosen in the mid-sixties because that was
the diameter of the largest spacecraft that
could be put inside the shroud of the Saturn
V launch vehicle. Later, the diameter was
reduced to 3.2 meters to take advantage of
existing manufacturing, test and calibration
equipment. The broad boundaries of the
Viking mission were set by the capability of
the Titan launch vehicle. As a matter of fact,
in its formative stage, Viking was called the
Titan Orbiter-Lander Mission. An earlier
Mars orbiter-lander mission, Voyager, had
been planned for a Saturn V; this big
Voyager was canceled by Congress because it
was too large and too expensive and because
the scientists involved would not support
such an expensive mission at that stage in
the exploration of Mars. The competition
with the Soviets also helped set the bound-
aries for Viking. The scientific returns from
Viking had to be sufficient to justify the cost
of the mission, even though the Soviets
might land a spacecraft on Mars before
Viking got there. National needs--foreign
policy, security, development of new technol-
ogy and the maintenance of an institution or
a capability--may influence the size, scale
and timing of a mission. For a decade scien-
tists unsuccessfully tried to persuade NASA
to start a mission to study the interplanetary
medium near the Sun. After President
Johnson offered to undertake a joint space
mission with Germany, it took NASA just 24
hours to establish the HELIOS Mission to
make a close flyby of the sun. The need to
test the Titan IIIC launch before the launch
of the Viking mission dictated that HELIOS
would use the unproven Titan IIIC rather
than the existing Atlas-Centaur.
The actions of the members of Congress
as they review, authorize and appropriate
funds for a mission may help establish the
boundaries of a mission. A key chairperson
or a powerful committee member may decide
that a particular mission is worth $500
million but not $750 million; the chairperson
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may decide to support a mission if it will in-
crease employment or prevent the closure of
a facility in the chairperson's district.
Purists may argue that systems engi-
neering should focus on technical constraints
and need not take into account nebulous
political and managerial constraints. Unfor-
tunately, such constraints have been with us
since the first time two people joined togeth-
er to accomplish a task neither could do
alone. Incorporation of such constraints into
the systems engineering process is just as
important as incorporating the purely tech-
nical constraints. The division director,
however, must keep the political and techni-
cal constraints separate and should never
attempt to justify a political constraint with
some flimsy technical justification. If this
happens, the rest of the participants in the
mission will become confused and the
division director will lose credibility. If the
participants are kept straight, then later, if
relief is needed from some such constraint,
the division director will know who must be
persuaded to get relief and the kind of justifi-
cation that must be prepared.
In the early days of NASA, with a power-
ful administrator and with space exploration
a major national goal, a project manager
could ignore factors other than the scientific
and technical requirements. Today, the as-
sembly and maintenance of the necessary
support for the mission are so difficult that
these other factors may become as impor-
tant, if not more important, than the re-
quirements derived from the objectives of the
mission.
Out of this combination of political and
technical considerations, the major bound-
aries are set for a mission. The launch vehi-
cle is selected, the project management
center is picked, the trajectory and a
tentative launch date identified, and a rough
idea formed of the kind and number of
instruments that will make up the payload.
The availability of transportation and the
support of the Office of Operations is estab-
lished. A rough cost estimate is made.
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THE ROLE OF THE PAYLOAD AND THE
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS
As soon as the broad boundaries of a mission
are established and the division director is
confident about obtaining approval, the
groundwork begins for selecting principal
investigators--the scientists who will per-
form the mission experiments. To make the
selection, the division director first needs to
know how many and what kind of instru-
ments can be placed on the spacecraft, an
analysis accomplished by two working
groups: a Payload Working Group and a
Technical Working Group. The Payload
Working Group consists of NASA and aca-
demic scientists from the scientific disci-
plines involved in the mission, and the Tech-
nical Working Group of system engineers
and discipline engineers representing all the
engineering disciplines and subsystems re-
quired to design, build and operate the
spacecraft. Working together, these two
groups will design a trial payload that will
accomplish the scientific objectives of the
mission and a spacecraft capable of support-
ing that payload. In this joint activity, we
begin to incorporate the user requirements
into the systems engineering process.
The trial payload and the spacecraft
emerge through an iterative process. The
members of the Payload Working Group se-
lect a trial payload--a group of instruments
that accomplish the objectives of the mission.
In assembling this trial payload, the Payload
Working Group may invite scientists to come
to a meeting to describe instruments they
hope to fly on the mission. They may invent
new instruments that are needed to accom-
plish the objectives. The Payload Working
Group will estimate the weight, volume,
power and communication needs, and specify
the orientation and stabilization require-
ments for each instrument. One or more
members of the Technical Working Group
will attend the meetings of the Payload
Working Group to help them develop the re-
quirements and to design the spacecraft and
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bring back to the Technical Working Group a
better understanding of the payload that is
emerging.
Meanwhile, the Technical Working
Group will use the scientific objectives and
broad constraints of the mission and design a
hypothetical spacecraft for the mission. The
Technical Working Group then takes the
first trial payload prepared by the Payload
Working Group and integrates it into the
spacecraft. The two groups then hold a joint
session where the Technical Working Group
reviews the fit between the payload and the
spacecraft, and the descriptions" of changes
that must be made either in the spacecraft or
in the payload to make them compatible.
Additional power may be required, the struc-
ture of the spacecraft modified, or one or
more instruments may have to be redesigned
or eliminated. At the conclusion of the joint
meeting, the two groups agree on the actions
each will take during the next iteration with
the mutual objective of making the payload
and the spacecraft compatible. The Payload
Working Group refines the payload and the
Technical Working Group refines the design
of the spacecraft. They meet again, review
their progress, and decide on the next course
of action.
After a year or so of joint effort and two or
three such iterations, a spacecraft and a
payload will emerge that are satisfactory to
both groups, the scientific community, the
division director, the program manager, the
program scientist and to senior NASA man-
agement. The division director and the pro-
gram scientists are now ready to select the
actual scientists, and their instruments, for
the mission.
SELECTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC
EXPERIMENTS
The associate administrator for the Office of
Space Science and Applications selects the
scientists who do research in space. The divi-
sion director, using an ancient procedure
established in 1960, is in charge of all the ac-
tivities associated with the selection process.
People sometimes ask why the experiments
are selected by an official at NASA Head-
quarters rather than by one at the NASA
Center that will manage the project. Others
ask, why not use the instruments selected by
the Payload Working Group for the trial pay-
load and avoid all the time and energy that
goes into the NASA selection process? Why
NASA Headquarters, why not the National
Academy of Sciences Space Science Board?
These are good questions, and in some cases,
the answer is easy: the particular method
has been tried and found not to work; in oth-
ers, the answer is not obvious and some ex-
planation is necessary.
History shows that the nation needs a
vigorous broad-based space science program
that involves many academic scientists.
Academic scientists are a fertile source of
new ideas, and their involvement rapidly
disseminates the knowledge and experience
gained in the space program to the next gen-
eration of scientists and engineers. In addi-
tion, the participation of academic scientists
and their graduate students helps assure a
continuing supply of space scientists and
aerospace engineers. Academic scientists
also form a strong, vociferous lobby for the
NASA space science program.
History also shows that NASA needs
competent, creative scientists at its Centers
to help conceive and design new missions
and to work with the academic scientists
who participate in NASA's missions.
The academic scientists and the NASA
scientists at the Centers fiercely compete for
the right to conduct investigations on NASA
missions. If an official at the Center respon-
sible for the mission selected the principal
investigators, then the academic scientists
would feel that the Center scientists had an
unfair advantage. The NASA scientists
would be more familiar with the mission and
therefore able to prepare better proposals. In
addition, they would be colleagues of the
Center people handling the selection. If the
Space Science Board, made up entirely of
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non-NASA scientists, handled the selection,
then the .NASA scientists would feel that
academic scientists had an unfair advan-
tage. By mutual agreement between NASA
and the Academy, NASA scientists cannot
serve on the Board because they would be
providing advice to themselves.
NASA procedures were formulated to re-
duce the fears of these two groups of scien-
tists and to encourage them to participate in
NASA's space science program. NASA pro-
vides a competitive process that assures
equal access to NASA's space science mis-
sions for all scientists, whether they are at
universities, NASA Centers or in industry,
and whether they are domestic or foreign
scientists. Administrative scientists at
NASA Headquarters, who are no longer con-
ducting research and hence have no conflict
of interest, conduct the selection process.
The selection process proceeds through
three stages. The first stage, the creation of a
trial payload and the design of the space-
craft, was discussed above. Next NASA
issues an Announcement of Flight Opportu-
nity (AFO) to scientists to inform them that
NASA intends to proceed with the mission
and invites them to submit a proposal to
conduct experiments during the mission.
After the proposals are submitted, they are
evaluated, and a final selection is made by
NASA Headquarters.
THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF FLIGHT
OPPORTUNITY
As soon as the division director is reasonably
sure that the mission will be approved by
NASA senior management and by Congress,
he or she will issue an AFO. The AFO speci-
fies the objectives of the mission and invites
scientists to propose investigations. It gives
the ground rules for the proposals and the
deadline for their submission.
The AFO is a very important document.
Several (sometimes 100 or more) teams of
scientists will spend several months prepar-
ing their proposals. Each team consists of
scientists, engineers and financial analysts
who use the information in the AFO to pre-
pare the scientific, technical and financial
parts of their proposals. Their written pro-
posal is the final and generally the only
opportunity they have to persuade NASA to
select their experiment. (Sometimes com-
peting scientists are invited to brief the re-
viewers.) NASA bases its selection on the
written proposal. Once the procedure is
completed and the experiments are selected,
it is almost impossible for a dissatisfied
scientist to overturn the decision. Once the
selections are made and contracts awarded,
the principal investigator's team is legally
obligated to produce the instrument, conduct
the experiment and publish the results.
NASA is legally obligated to provide funds
and space on the spacecraft and to conduct
flight operations and provide data to the in-
vestigator.
Careful preparation of the AFO is essen-
tial. Large amounts of time and energy are
required to prepare and evaluate the propos-
als. If the information in the AFO is
inadequate or wrong, experimenters may be
discouraged from competing, or experiment-
ers with instruments not suitable for the
spacecraft may be selected, which can lead to
costly overruns or schedule slips.
The preliminary systems engineering
done by the Technical Working Group and
the Payload Working Group plays a crucial
role in the preparation of the AFO. The AFO
contains a description of the trial payload
and the spacecraft generated by the two
working groups. The AFO specifies the sub-
systems planned for the spacecraft in suffi-
cient detail so that the proposers can design
their instruments to function in harmony
with subsystems. The AFO must specify any
special requirements for the instruments
such as the need to keep electromagnetic
interference, nuclear radiation levels or
outgassing below specified levels. The ther-
mal characteristics of the spacecraft are de-
scribed, and the thermal specifications that
the instruments must meet are included.
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The AFO specifies the date the proposals
must be returned and in some cases limits
the number of pages of a proposal to avoid
getting lengthy proposals loaded with ex-
traneous information.
EVALUATING THE PROPOSALS
The scientists send their proposals to the di-
vision director at NASA Headquarters who
is responsible for the mission. After receipt
of all proposals, the division director forms
two groups to assist in the evaluation. The
first group, chaired by the program scientist,
consists of scientists who are peers of those
proposing experiments and who will evalu-
ate the scientific and technical merits of the
proposals and assign them a priority for
inclusion in the mission. This group of scien-
tists must be free of any legal conflict of
interest with respect to any of the proposals,
which is the reason why they cannot be cho-
sen until all the proposals are in. The second
group consists of engineers at the project
management Center similar in membership
to the Technical Working Group (in many
cases it will be the Technical Working
Group). This group will examine all the pro-
posals to see if the instruments proposed are
compatible with the spacecraft and judge
whether the proposer has the team and the
facilities required to carry out the investiga-
tion.
As soon as the division director has the
proposals, copies are sent to both groups.
After the two groups complete their work,
they send the results of their evaluation to
the division director. If an otherwise high
priority investigation is incompatible with
the spacecraft, the division director may ask
the project team to conduct a short study to
determine whether the instrument or the
spacecraft can be modified to make the two
compatible and, if so, to prepare an estimate
of the costs involved.
After receiving the evaluation made by
the scientific working group and the project
team, the division director and the chief
scientists prepare a list of the principal
investigators who they think are the best
qualified to accomplish the objectives of the
mission. Their selection is based on, and
must be consistent with, the evaluations of
the scientists and the project team. The divi-
sion director is free to choose between two
competing proposals that have been given
the same priority by the scientists but is not
free to pick a proposal that was given a lower
priority. In other words, the division director
must select a principal investigator whose
proposal was placed in Category I by the
scientific working group rather than pick an
investigator whose proposal was placed in
Category II, even though the Category II
experiment might be cheaper or easier to
integrate with the spacecraft. The instru-
ments of the principal investigators selected
must be certified compatible with the space-
craft or the division director must have the
results of a study that shows that the instru-
ment or the mission can be modified to make
the instrument compatible. Since each of the
investigators selected has proposed a specific
instrument, in the process of selecting the
investigators the division director has also
selected the suite of instruments that will
make up the payload for the mission.
After completing the list of principal
investigators and the justification for their
selection, the division director takes the
recommendations to the members of the
Space Science Steering Committee for their
review and recommendation.
THE ROLE OF THE SPACE SCIENCE
STEERING COMMITTEE
The Space Science Steering Committee is
composed of the directors and the deputies of
each of the program divisions in the Office of
Space and Applications. Traditionally, if the
director is an engineer, the deputy is a scien-
tist and vice versa. Thus the Space Science
Steering Committee consists of roughly
equal numbers of scientists and engineers
and is capable of reviewing the merits of
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investigators, the selection procedure, and
all other technical and managerial aspects of
the mission. It is chaired by the chief scien-
tists in Office of Space Science and Applica-
tions and reports directly to the associate ad-
ministrator for that Office.
The Space Science Steering Committee
reviews the investigations that have been
selected and the process by which they were
selected. It reviews the investigations for
their scientific and technical merit and for
their compatibility with the spacecraft. If
there are any objections or reservations
raised by anyone about the payload, the
Space Science Steering Committee reviews
those objections. Normally the investigators
chosen by the division director are accepted;
however, if a member of the Steering Com-
mittee objects to a selection or questions the
selection process, then the Committee may
send the division director back to prepare a
different version of the payload.
The Space Science Steering Committee
serves as the court of final review for a pay-
load. By its acceptance of the principal inves-
tigators and their instruments, it certifies
that, up to this stage, the user requirements
have been properly incorporated into the sys-
tems engineering process for the mission.
After the members of the Committee com-
plete their review, the chairperson sends
their recommendations to the associate ad-
ministrator of the Office of Space Science and
Applications who approves the investigators.
After approval of the investigators by the
associate administrator, the only way to
change an investigator or an instrument is to
appeal over the head of the associate admin-
istrator, to the deputy administrator or the
administrator of NASA. Only once in the
past 30 years has the decision of an associate
administrator been reversed. In that case,
NASA modified its selection procedure to
facilitate the selection of investigators for
the Apollo-Soyuz Mission. The chairperson of
the Space Science Board objected to the
change; NASA redid its selection and fol-
lowed the normal procedure.
THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR'S
APPROVAL
After the associate administrator approves
the principal investigators, each of them is
sent a letter to inform them of their selection
and to give them any guidelines or qualifica-
tions that come from the selection process.
For instance, only a part of the investigator's
proposal may have been approved or the
investigator may have agreed to provide en-
vironmental data to other investigators on
the mission to aid them in the interpretation
of their data. Funding for the mission may be
limited; the associate administrator may
direct each investigator to control costs very
carefully and request that some aspect of the
investigation be modified or excluded if it
becomes apparent that the costs will exceed
the funds allocated for the investigation. If
the interest in the mission is high and the
funds are limited or the resources of the
spacecraft, such as the weight, power and
telemetry, are very constrained, the associ-
ate administrator may give provisional ap-
proval to one or more investigators pending
an analysis by the project to determine if the
res.ources are available.
The associate administrator's letter to a
principal investigator is an informal con-
tract between the associate administrator
and the principal investigator that obligates
the investigator to devote the time and ener-
gy required to accomplish the objectives of
the investigation. It obligates the associate
administrator to proceed with the mission
and provide the resources and assistance
that the principal investigator will need.
At the same time the letters are sent to
the principal investigators, the associate ad-
ministrator also sends a letter to the director
of the Center responsible for managing the
project. This letter notifies the director of the
investigators selected and the qualifications
or guidelines that have been given. The
letter is accompanied by the authorization
and transfer of funds that enable the project
team to negotiate contracts with and fund
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the work of the principal investigators. This
contract should provide for the support of the
principal investigator and specify the work
to be done during design, manufacture, pre-
flight testing, operations, analysis of the
data and publication of the results. The fun-
ding for data analysis is normally carried in
a separate line item in the Space Science
budget and is transferred to the Center
through a separate channel at a later date.
Regardless of how the funding for the oper-
ational phase is handled, the associate ad-
ministrator should require that the project
team provide for data analysis and publica-
tion of the results in these contracts with the
principal investigators. The incorporation of
the user requirements into the systems engi-
neering process will not be complete unless
all phases of the mission are considered,
including data analysis, interpretation and
publication of the results.
The Space Science Steering Committee's
review and the associate administrator's ap-
proval of the principal investigators com-
plete those phases of the mission that are led
by the division director at NASA Headquar-
ters. Once the investigators have been
selected, the focus of the work shifts from
Headquarters to the Center, where the pro-
ject manager and the project scientist take
over the technical and scientific leadership of
the mission. They are responsible for the
final steps in the incorporation of the users
requirements into the systems engineering
process.
ASSESSMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL
INVESTIGATORS
When the associate administrator for the
Office of Space Science and Applications
selects the principal investigators and au-
thorizes the Center to negotiate contracts
with them, the responsibility for working
with the scientists is transferred from the
division director and the program scientists
at Headquarters to the project manager and
the project scientists at the Center. Receipt
of the letter triggers an intensive assessment
by the project manager of each investigator
and of the status of each instrument. This
assessment should be completed prior to the
beginning of preliminary design activity.
The assessment is conducted by a team
appointed by the project manager. The team
consists of several engineers from the Cen-
ter. A key member of the project manager's
review team is the project scientist, who,
among other tasks, serves as the communi-
cation link between the investigators and
the project team.
THE ROLE OF THE PROJECT SCIENTIST
The Center director, with concurrence of the
Office of Space Science and Applications as-
sociate administrator, appoints the mission's
project scientist. This project scientist has a
powerful role during a scientific mission,
quite different from that of the project man-
ager and, at this stage, equally important. If
the project scientist and the project manager
have a conflict they cannot resolve and that
may affect the mission's scientific outcome,
the project scientist is expected to carry the
case to Center management and, if it is a
good case, to prevail.
The project scientist should have as vest-
ed an interest in the scientific success of the
mission as the one who conceived the mission
or as an investigator on the mission. As an
experienced space scientist and person who
has conducted investigations in space, the
project scientist should understand what
information the project needs from the prin-
cipal investigator in order to conduct the
mission and should be able to accurately
communicate those requirements, and the
reasons for them, to the scientists. The pro-
ject scientist should understand the techni-
cal requirements submitted by the principal
investigators and be able to communicate
them to the project. In addition, the project
scientist should be able to judge which of the
requirements of the principal investigator
are mandatory and which are only highly
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desirable so that the resources of the project
are not squandered. Conversely, the project
scientist should be able to sort out the highly
desirable from the mandatory requirements
of the project manager so that unnecessary
constraints, reporting requirements or re-
views are not placed on the principal investi-
gators. Clearly, the project scientist must
have the confidence of the project manager
and the investigators on the mission in order
to succeed. The assessment of the principal
investigators provides an excellent opportu-
nity for the project scientist to become a reli-
able representative of the scientists to the
project team and of the project team to the
scientists.
People ask, why all this concern about the
communication channel between the project
and the investigators? Why can't the project
manager deal with the investigators just as
one would with the person responsible for
any other subsystem on the spacecraft?
Early experience in space science showed
that a project manager who was not a scien-
tist, or who did not have a strong competent
project scientist working with him or her,
usually got into one of two kinds of trouble.
Either the project manager regarded the
scientists as all powerful and gave in to all
their whims, thereby driving the costs of the
mission out of sight, or the project manager
regarded the scientists as overly bright
children and overrode their legitimate re-
quests, thus causing their instruments to fail
or forcing the scientists to complain to Cen-
ter management or NASA Headquarters and
try to get the project manager replaced.
FACT FINDING
The initial assessment of each principal in-
vestigator by the project team is the most im-
portant part of the incorporation of the user
requirements into the systems engineering
process of a mission. The primary purpose of
the assessment is to determine the technical
requirements of the instruments and their
compatibility with each other and with the
spacecraft and the operational equipment. In
addition, it provides the project manager
with the first opportunity to determine the
experience and capability of each principal
investigator and of the team, and to assess
whether the investigator's institution can
and will provide the support that will be
needed.
The assessment begins with "fact find-
ing," a systematic effort by the review team
to collect information about the investiga-
tors. The team conducts its review at the in-
vestigator's institution, rather than bringing
the investigator and the team to the Center.
A visit to the institution enables the review
team to not only examine the laboratory
model of the instrument, but also to review
the calculations and test results that support
the design. The team can review the facili-
ties that will be available to investigators to
develop, test and calibrate the flight instru-
ments. If the investigator plans to have most
of the work done by a contractor, then the
review team conducts a similar review at the
contractor's plant.
The review should cover all the elements
that are required by the investigator to com-
plete the objectives of the experiment. By
"all the elements," I mean all the pieces of
hardware, all the facilities, all the testing
gear that will be required, and all the work
and the people that will be required to enable
the investigator to design, build, test and fly
the instrument. In addition, the review
should identify all the computers, all the pro-
grams and all the software that the investi-
gator will require to analyze the data and
publish the results. The review should cover
the entire mission, from design and develop-
ment, to testing and calibration, to place-
ment of the published results and of the data
in the archives. The plans, scheduled actions
and funding requirements as a function of
time are key elements to be reviewed. The
impact of project requirements on the inves-
tigator or the instrument should be covered
in the review. Throughout the review, its
two-way nature must be emphasized. The
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purpose of the review is to determine what
the investigator requires of the project and to
inform the investigator of the requirements
of the project.
The review begins with information and
data collection by the team. The team must
collect information on the technical re-
sources on the spacecraft that the instru-
ment requires such as weight, telemetry,
band width, volume, power, commands and
thermal control.
The team must collect data on the engineer-
ing constraints imposed by the instrument
on the spacecraft, including but not limited
to:
Location of the instrument
Look angle and field of view
Pointing and stabilization required
Operational requirements
Special treatment during testing, launch,
and operations
Limitations on vibration and shock
Limitations on stray electromagnetic
fields
Limitations on material surrounding the
instrument
Limitations on outgassing.
The team needs to know the facilities
that will be required by the instrument and
their availability, either at the investigator's
institution, the contractor, or at the field
center or its contractors, including but not
limited to:
Vacuum chambers
Shock and vibration tables
Solar simulators
Computers
Special test and calibration facilities
Special data handling and analysis
facilities.
The team must collect information and plans
for the funding, manpower and management
capability that will be required by the inves-
tigator at the host institution and by the
project team to monitor the work of the
investigator.
Obviously, not all of this data will be
available at this first review. However,
where information is not available, the need
should be established and the project man-
ager and the principal investigator must
formulate a mutually acceptable plan as to
who will generate the information and on
what schedule.
This initial data gathering phase pro-
vides an excellent opportunity for the project
manager and the systems engineers to assess
the capability of the principal investigator
and the team. NASA policy makes the prin-
cipal investigator, responsible for all phases
of the investigation, beginning with the de-
sign of the instrument, continuing through
to the delivery of a calibrated, tested and
flight worthy instrument, and culminating
in the publication of the results. During the
review, the principal investigator should
demonstrate understanding and the ability
to discharge this responsibility and should
be able to describe how to conduct the day-
by-day work of the team. The principal
investigator should state whether the day-
by-day work of the team will be under the
investigator's direction or whether a man-
ager will be appointed to direct the work. If a
manager is appointed, do the principal inves-
tigator, the manager and the project
manager all understand the limits of the
authority of 'the manager? What decisions
can be made by the manager and which ones
must go to the investigator? Has the investi-
gator delegated sufficient authority to the
manager so that decisions can be made and
the work can be kept on schedule? How does
the principal investigator plan to oversee the
work of the manager? Does the investigator
plan to attend certain key reviews to see how
things are going? Will the manager give
weekly reports?
The project manager and the principal
investigator should agree on which reviews
the investigator will attend and which can
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be delegated to the manager. They also need
to agree on how they will resolve disputes
that will arise between the principal investi-
gator's manager and the project manager.
If the principal investigator plans to han-
dle the day-to-day operations, another set of
questions needs to be asked. Is the investiga-
tor prepared and able to spend the time and
energy to handle the daily work? Is the in-
vestigator prepared to travel to the Center or
to a contractor when reviews must be held
and decisions need to be made? Is the investi-
gator prepared to give up other research dur-
ing the development of the instrument?
Appointing a good project manager is
generally better for the investigator and the
team. The project manager can concentrate
on the daily activity of managing the team
and the investigator can focus on meeting
the requirements that will be levied by the
project manager and the team.
The review team needs to ask other ques-
tions. Is the investigator's team adequate for
the task? Have they planned their work and
laid out a sensible schedule? Are they cooper-
ative and forthright about the status of their
instrument? Are the kinds of engineers and
technicians that will be needed either on the
investigator's team or at the contractor? Has
the investigator done a good job estimating
the costs as a function of time? Has a reserve
been allowed for unforeseen problems, and if
so, have criteria and a schedule been laid out
for its use? Any weakness in planning or
management at this stage, if not corrected,
will inevitably result in more serious prob-
lems later in the project.
The analysis of the strengths and weak-
nesses of a principal investigator's team
serves an important function in the incor-
poration of the user requirements into the
systems engineering process. If an investiga-
tor has a competent team and adequate
facilities and equipment, the project man-
ager can reduce the monitoring require-
ments for that investigator. The investigator
can reduce the time allocated for testing and
integration and may waive certain tests. On
the other hand, if the investigator has a
weak team or inadequate facilities, then the
project manager has to lay out a project plan
and a schedule that takes this weakness into
account. Additional money must be set aside
to cover overruns. Provisions for additional
monitoring must be made and additional
time for testing and integration must be
allowed. An engineer from the project may
be assigned to aid the investigator. The in-
vestigator is placed on the list of the project's
"Top Ten Problems," thereby alerting the
Center management and Headquarters of
the problem. Any management or technical
problems unearthed in this initial assess-
ment should be treated just as thoroughly
and just as promptly as the failure of any
subsystem would be treated later in the
schedule. Prompt action at this stage will
prevent many hardware problems from aris-
ing later when there is less time and less
money to resolve them.
The review of each principal investigator
culminates in the negotiation of a contract
between the Center and principal investiga-
tor, whereby the investigator is to produce a
flight instrument using funds provided by
the Center. At the conclusion of the assess-
ment process, a principal investigator will
have two contracts: one with the associate
administrator of the Office for Space Science
and Applications to accomplish the objec-
tives of the experiment proposed, and the
other with the project management center to
produce an instrument that is ready for
flight. A principal investigator who thinks
that a Center decision will jeopardize the
investigation has the right to appeal the
decision directly to the associate administra-
tor of the Office for Space Science and Appli-
cations. This appeal channel is rarely, if
ever, used.
THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
Once the review team has completed its fact
finding and its assessment of the investiga-
tor's capability, the systems engineers are
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ready to complete the conventional systems
analysis of the system. The information the
review team has collected enables them to
incorporate the user requirements into that
process.
By this time, all the broad boundaries of
the mission are established; the investiga-
tors have been selected, a preliminary design
of the spacecraft is available, the transporta-
tion system is specified, the total cost of the
mission has been set (or a ceiling placed on
the total cost) and a preliminary launch date
scheduled.
If there is no hard fast launch date, then
the launch schedule may become a variable
in the systems analysis and shifted forward
or back to reduce costs or improve the scien-
tific return of the mission. If it is a planetary
mission, however, the launch date is not a
variable but is rigorously set by planetary
dynamics; the role of the systems engineer is
to identify the decisions that must be made
and the actions that must be taken to assure
the sanctity of that launch date.
In the case of a high priority scientific
mission, such as Viking or the Hubble Space
Telescope, the scientific objectives may be
the primary constraint. The systems engi-
neer can adjust the launch vehicle, the
launch date and the total cost to meet the
scientific objectives.
For most missions, however, the primary
constraints will be technical and financial.
The launch vehicle may be specified; there
may be a cap on the funding, certain subsys-
tems may be specified and in many cases the
spacecraft itself will be specified. In such
highly constrained missions, the only vari-
ables the systems engineer has to work with
are the number and complexity of the scien-
tific instruments that can be accommodated.
For such highly constrained missions, the
associate administrator of the Office of Space
Science and Applications will usually select
a core payload that is certain to be accom-
modated and then add one or more in-
vestigations to be included if the systems
analysis shows they can be accommodated.
In this highly constrained case, the systems
engineer takes the requirements of the core
payload and the existing constraints
and,working closely with the project scien-
tist and the principal investigators, makes a
number of tradeoff studies to determine the
maximum number of investigations that can
be accommodated and the maximum amount
of scientific information that can be collect-
ed.
The objective of the systems engineering
effort at this stage is to plan the entire mis-
sion, establish the specifications for the in-
struments and the spacecraft, lay out a
schedule for all the activities of the mission,
establish milestones for completion of major
activities, schedule the testing and integra-
tion work, set a launch date, estimate the
cost and lay out a funding plan for the entire
mission. The systems engineers identify any
technical conflicts that exist between instru-
ments or between an instrument and the
spacecraft. Where they find conflicts, they
identify the options available to the project
to solve them, conduct tradeoffs between the
options and recommend the option that they
think will produce the greatest scientific
return for the lowest cost.
As the systems engineers conduct their
analyses, there is a continuous iteration pro-
cess that takes place throughout the project
and among the investigators. Different loca-
tions of the instruments on the spacecraft
are studied and discussed with the investiga-
tors to determine which are best. Tradeoffs
may have to be made between the value of
adding an investigation and adding more
power or more telemetry bandwidth for the
core payload. In rare instances, the systems
analysis may show that additional resources
are available on the spacecraft; then trade-
offs are made to determine how to allocate
the resources among the investigators to bet-
ter accomplish the scientific objectives.
Many complicated tradeoffs are made at
this stage in a project. As an example, sys-
tems engineers working closely with the
project scientist and the investigators may
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conduct tradeoffs to determine how much
data processing should be done on board by
each instrument, thereby increasing the
weight and power required by the instru-
ments but reducing the complexity of, and
the weight and power required by, the com-
munications system of the spacecraft.
Mutually acceptable schedules for the use
of common ground facilities such as shake
tables, vacuum chambers and calibration
equipment are worked out between the pro-
ject, the investigators and the persons re-
sponsible for those facilities. A detailed
schedule of all the tests, calibration runs and
flight operations is established with each in-
vestigator. These schedules, as emphasized
repeatedly in this paper, should carry
through flight operations and data analysis.
Only by doing this can a systems engineer be
sure that all the requirements of the scien-
tists have been incorporated into the mission
plan. By forcing the occasionally unwilling
investigator to sit down and think through
the entire experiment, the systems engineer
may bring to the surface a major technical
problem or an inadequate cost estimate.
Once the entire mission is laid out, the in-
vestigators accommodated, their expenses
estimated and a launch date established, the
systems engineer must estimate how much
and what kind of resources need to be re-
served for unanticipated problems. Extra
slack time must be placed in the schedule to
accomplish unanticipated work. The systems
engineer must reserve some weight, power
and communications capability for shortages
that will inevitably arise. Funds to cover
overruns must be reserved and a schedule by
which the funds are to be released must be
prepared. If there is no schedule for the re-
lease of reserve funds, then they may all be
used up in the early months of the project,
leaving nothing for the major problems that
will occur later.
The project manager and the overseers at
the Center and Headquarters should exam-
ine any deviation by an investigator from the
planned use of the reserves with the same
care they would examine an instrument that
is not meeting its design specifications or its
milestones. Such a deviation in the rate of
use of reserves may identify a weakness in
the investigator's team or in the design of
the instrument early in the development
cycle. If the project manager takes prompt
action when an unexpected use of the re-
serves is first seen, technical or schedule
problems that may occur later in the devel-
opment phase can be eliminated or reduced.
At this time, the project manager estab-
lishes another important policy--how the
information about the reserves will be treat-
ed. The project manager can choose to oper-
ate somewhere between two extremes:
"everything on the table" or "hold all the
cards close to the chest." In the first extreme,
everybody in the project is informed, includ-
ing all the subsystem managers, all the
principal investigators and the contractors,
exactly what the reserves are, who is holding
them and the schedule for their use. At the
other extreme, the project manager treats
the reserves as highly classified information
known only to the project manager and possi-
bly some of the senior management. Both
extremes have worked. The choice largely
depends on the experience and personality of
the project manager and NASA's current
management philosophy. A new, insecure or
weak project manager may want to keep this
information confidential to help control the
project. A more confident project manager
may choose to operate an open system. If a
project manager chooses to operate an open
system, there must be a willingness to accept
a high level of acrimony in the project. A
principal investigator fighting a weight
problem or overrunning the budget will eye a
compatriot's reserve and scheme to get it. On
the other hand, by operating in an open
manner the project manager may create a
more healthy climate of trust between the
investigators and the project team and
thereby discover problems earlier than if all
the reserves are kept secret. Sharing knowl-
edge of the problems and the reserve being
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maintained can help a project manager pro-
mote teamwork on the project, raise the mo-
rale, and encourage the investigators to
carefully manage their reserves. On the oth-
er hand, if NASA's current policy is to pull
all identifiable reserves into a Headquarters
reserve to be held by the comptroller, then
project managers will instinctively bury any
financial reserves somewhere in the project.
Ultimately, the user requirements will be
assimilated into the systems engineering
process, the preliminary designs will be com-
pleted, the schedules established, and the
rate of expenditure established. When this is
done, the project is ready for its first major
design review, the preliminary design re-
view.
PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW
The Preliminary Design Review (PDR) ends
the preliminary design work, and completes
the incorporation of user requirements into
the systems engineering process. All aspects
of the mission and all future activities re-
quired to accomplish the mission should be
planned by this time.
The choice of a chairperson for the PDR
depends upon the complexity, cost and
national interest in the project. The division
director may chair the PDR of a routine,
small scientific project. The associate admin-
istrator for the Office of Space Science and
Applications will chair the PDR of a larger,
more complex mission. The administrator or
deputy administrator of NASA may chair
the PDR of a large, complex, costly, highly
visible mission such as the Hubble Tele-
scope, or Earth Observing System. The
chairperson should be someone who thrives
on crowds and controversy and has a vast
curiosity about the mission and a penchant
for uncovering unforeseen or concealed prob-
lems. The chairperson should use the PDR to
identfy and resolve any issues that the pro-
ject team or the investigators may have over-
looked or may be trying to avoid.
The good chairperson goes around the
room after the discussion of a controversial
item and questions the key people involved
to see if they all understand and agree on the
project's plan. The chairperson of the PDR
cannot be a "shrinking violet" or an introvert
(at least not during a PDR).
The project manager conducts the review.
Attendance from Headquarters includes, but
is not be limited to: the associate administra-
tor for the Office of Space Science and Appli-
cations or a designee, the division director,
the program manager, the program scientist,
the financial analyst, the NASA comptroller
or the designee, and the associate adminis-
trators for the Offices of Space Flight and
Operations or their designees. Someone from
the Office of International Affairs attends if
there are foreign investigators or if it is a
joint mission with another country. Atten-
dance from the Center will include the direc-
tor, the financial analysts, representatives of
the engineering disciplines and the systems
engineers. All the principal investigators
attend. Senior people from the major con-
tractors also attend. If the PDR is for an
applications mission, then senior people from
the agency who will use the system will
attend.
The chairperson expects the project man-
ager to present a clear, concise statement of
the overall objectives of the mission. If there
are other nonscientific objectives for the
missionDif, for instance, one of the objec-
tives is to test a new subsystem, a new space-
craft or a new tracking system--then the
project manager is expected to clearly specify
the relationship and priorities between those
other objectives and the scientific objectives.
The chairperson should make sure that all
objectives are clear, understood and agreed
to by the attendees.
The project manager should present a
complete schedule, extending from the PDR
through the Critical Design Review, on
through development, testing and calibra-
tion of the instruments and continue on to
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launch operations, data analysis and publi-
cation or use of the results. Slack time should
be clearly shown. Even though detailed
plans for operation and data analysis may
not be complete at this time, the systems
engineering process should have produced a
list of the facilities required and a schedule
for their use. Very often, the examination of
the mission's schedule at the PDR will un-
cover potential conflicts for the use of facili-
ties or an underestimate of the cost of some
phase of the mission.
The chairperson reviews the status of
each instrument. Ideally, the review of an in-
strument will consist of two parts, a presen-
tation by the principal investigator followed
by the project scientist's assessment of the
status of the instrument. The principal in-
vestigator should describe the experiment,
its objectives and how they relate to the
objectives of the mission. The principal in-
vestigator should describe the instrument,
show the schedule and slack times, and
present a cost breakdown and a funding
schedule. The investigator should identify
any issues with the project manager, includ-
ing any foreseeable technical and procure-
ment problems, and list the top four or five
problems. The project scientist should then
give the project's view of the status of the
instrument and should state whether the
project agrees with the status as presented
by the investigator. The project scientist
should present any concerns the project has
about the principal investigator, the team,
the institution or the contractor.
This review by the project scientist at the
PDR should not lead to a confrontation be-
tween the principal investigator and the pro-
ject scientist or the project manager; through
earlier discussions, each should be aware of
what the other intends to say; each should be
aware of the concerns of the other and at the
review they should present a jointly devel-
oped plan to solve the problems that exist.
The project manager and the principal inves-
tigator should understand and accept the
actions that the other intends to take to
resolve the problems. If the investigator has
only a tentative approval to fly on the mis-
sion, then the actions and milestones should
be specified that will lead to final acceptance
or rejection.
The project manager or the manager's
designee should review the status of the
other elements of the mission, their sched-
ules and problems. If the cost or configura-
tion of a subsystem is being determined by a
requirement of a particular investigation,
that fact should be presented so that senior
management and the principal investigator
can decide whether the particular aspect of
the investigation merits the additional cost
or complexity.
The project team should present an over-
all assessment of the instruments and their
interaction with each other and with the
subsystems on the spacecraft. The project
manager may elect to divide the experiments
into two groups: one group consisting of
those investigations in which the design of
the instrument is on schedule, within bud-
get, and the investigator is not in need of
careful monitoring; the second group consist-
ing of those instruments that have major
problems, that will require careful monitor-
ing and perhaps even a backup instrument.
The project manager should review the
status of the resources available to the pro-
ject, the reserves that are being held and the
schedule for their release. At the conclusion
of the PDR, the project manager should
identify the top 10 problems for the overall
project and describe plans to resolve them.
At the conclusion of the PDR, all the
participantsmHeadquarters, Center man-
agement, the project team, the principal
investigators and the subsystem managersm
should all understand and accept the status
and requirements of the investigations
scheduled for the mission. The principal
investigators should agree with the status of
their experiment as presented, and they
should understand and be prepared to accept
the requirements and meet the schedules
that have been placed on them by the project.
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Once the actions that were assigned to the
project and the investigators by the PDR
have been completed, the requirements of
the investigators should be incorporated into
the systems engineering process. The project
team and the investigators are then ready to
proceed with the detailed design and manu-
facture of the instruments and the space-
craft.
The majority of the systems engineering
effort required to incorporate the user re-
quirements should be complete at this time.
Normal project management and engineer-
ing techniques should be adequate to com-
plete the integration of the investigators into
the mission. There will, however, be a
continuing need for systems engineers to
support the project team. No matter how
good and how complete the systems engi-
neering effort has been, and how carefully
the PDR is conducted, problems will still be
encountered in the instruments or in the
subsystems and changes will have to be
made. The systems engineer will have to
trace the impact of those changes through
the system, identify the problems that are
created and provide the options for their
solution. Inevitably, there will be a shortage
of resources available--additional power or
weight required--and the systems engineer
will have to assess the system to see how the
resources can be found and analyze the im-
pact of using those resources. Occasionally,
excess resources will become available; the
systems engineer will have to examine these
extra reserves and determine how they can
best be applied to enhance the quality of the
mission.
As the work progresses, the engineers
will eventually understand the instruments
and their spacecraft, their designs will be
frozen, all the options will be eliminated and
the systems engineer will no longer be need-
ed. Sometime before this stage is reached,
the good systems engineers will become
bored and will move on to a new system with
new challenges.
GLOSSARY
Mission. An effort to increase human knowl-
edge that requires the launch of one or more
spacecraft. A mission begins with the initial
concept and concludes with the publication of
the results.
System. All the tasks and all the equipment,
both ground and space based, required to ac-
complish a mission.
Systems engineering. The systematic
planning activity that begins with the mis-
sion objectives and the requirements of the
scientists and turns them into specifications
for hardware and facilities, conducts tradeoff
studies between competing subsystems, ana-
lyzes the interaction between the subsys-
tems to eliminate unwanted interference,
and prepares schedules, cost estimates and
funding plans.
Program. The formulation and documenta-
tion of a mission prepared by NASA Head-
quarters and used to obtain authorization
and funding from Congress to conduct the
mission.
Project. All the equipment produced or pur-
chased by, and all the activity conducted and
directed by, a NASA Center to accomplish a
mission.
Division director. An individual at NASA
Headquarters responsible for a group of re-
lated scientific programs.
Program manager. A person, usually an
engineer, at NASA Headquarters in charge
of a program. A program manager reports to
a division director.
Program scientist. A scientist at NASA
Headquarters responsible for formulating
the scientific objectives of a program. A pro-
gram scientist reports to a division director.
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Project manager. The person, usually an
engineer, at a NASA Center who is responsi-
ble for the success of a project. The project
manager reports to the senior management
of the Center.
Project scientist. The scientist at a NASA
Center responsible for accomplishing the
scientific objectives of a project. The project
scientist reports to the senior management
of the Center.
Principal investigator. A scientist, select-
ed by NASA Headquarters, to conduct an
experiment during a mission.
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